



Southem  Afrca Department
and  South  Asia  Country  Department  II







M.  Ataman  Aksoy
and
Helena  Tang
Macroeconomic  and  trade  policies  must  change  signicanty  to
shift  India's economy  to a more  export-oriented  path  - both to
overcome foreign exchange shortages and to rely more on
external demand  for industrial  output.  High elasticities  in the
manufacturing  sector indicate that the economy would also
respond  favorably  to changes  in incentives.
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In the 1960s and 1970s, India's policy of encour-  relative to domestic output because of increasing
aging self-sufficiency by restricting imports was  tariffs, large real devaluations (especially after
complemented by regulation of all facets of the  1986), and rapidly expanding domestic demand,
industrial environment. Still, India developed a  which have made the domestic market more
large, diversified manufacturing sector. In 1977-  attractive than exports.
78, the policy environment began to change -
with a relaxing of import controls and restric-  Policy reform has led to faster growth of
tions that has continued until now. With reform  manufact uing output and productivity, but the
of industrial policies and a more expansionary  main force behind faster growth has been
macroeconomic policy, the value added in  increased public spending fueled by growing
manufacturing grew from 4.5 percent a year in  fiscal deficits. Another important variable has
the 1970s to 7.9 percent a year in the 1980s.  been a more accommodating import policy
Meanwhile, gradual depreciation of the currency  sustained by large extemal borrowings. This
since 1985 has encouraged exports and brought  pattern of growth is not sustainable because of
prices in India closer to world levels.  significant intemal and external debt stocks that
have accumulated over the last decade. Macro-
The faster growth of output and productivity  economic and trade policy must change signifi-
in the 1980s is a welcome change from India's  cantly to shift the economy to a more export-
earlier stagnation. But deteriorating macroeco-  oriented path - both to overcome the foreign
nomic balances have brought India to a balance  exchange shortages and to rely more on external
of payments crisis.  demand for industrial output.
Changes in tariffs and other instruments  Aksoy and Tang argue that the manufactur-
have more than compensated for relaxation of  ing sector is highly responsive to relative price
the import regime. Foreign trade has contracted  changes. Pessimism about elasticity has per-
relative to domestic output, despite some relax-  vaded Indian policymaking but they show high
ation of quantity restrictions and attempts to  elasticities, indicating that the economy would
increase exports. The main reason for this  respond favorably to changes in incentives.
decline has been the increase in import prices
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RBierences  4 1A.  INTRODUCTION
1.  Throughout  the  1960s  and  1970s  India's  policy  of  encouraging  self-
sufficiency  by  restricting  imports,  was  complemented  by  regulation  of  all
facets  of  the  industrial  environment.  Nevertheless,  this  policy  environment
did  enable  India  to  develop  a large  diversified  manufacturing  sector,  with  a
share  of  GDP  rising  from  13.9%  in  1960/61  to  21.62%  in  1987/88.  Real  manufac-
turing  value  added  has  grown  at  4.8%  p.a.  since  1960/61,  while  the  registered
manufacturing  has  grown  faster  at  5.2%  p.a.,  compared  to  GDP  growth  of  only
3.7%  p.a.
2.  Beginning  in  1977/78  the  policy  environment  started  to  change.  Import
controls  began  to  be  relaxed  and  the  process  of  easing  restrictions  on
selected  imports  has  continued  until  the  present.  Reforms  also  began  in
industrial  policies.  Accompanied  by  a  more  expansionary  macroeconomic  policy,
these  reforms  have  led  to  an  acceleration  of  the  growth  of  value  added  in
manufacturing  from  4.5%  p.a.  during  the  1970s  to  7.9%  p.a.  during  the  1980s.
The  registered  manufacturing  sector  has  done  even  better,  its  annual  growth
rate  increasing  from  4.4%  during  the  1970s  to  9.6%  during  the  1980s.  The  ICOR
for  the  manufacturing  sector  has  declined  indicating  increasing  factor
productivity  in  the  1980s.  Moreover,  gradual  depreciation  of  the  currency
since  1985  has  encouraged  increasing  exports  and  brought  the  prices  in  India
closer  to  world  levels.
3.  The  faster  growth  of  output  and  productivity  in  the  1980s  is  a  welcome
change  from  the  stagnation  of  the  earlier  period.  In  1988  the  output  level
was  double  of  that  in  1981. On  the  other  hand,  deteriorating  macroeconomic
balances  have brought  the  country  to  a major balance  of  payments crisis.
Faster  industrial  growth during  1980s was, however, accompanied  by  large
fiscal  and  current  account  deficits  that  have  led  to  unsustainable  internal
and  external  debt  burdens.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  clear  that  significant
reforms  have  been  implemented  in  the  trade  regime.  Tariff  collection  rates
have  doubled  to  more  than  60%  during  the  1980s,  which  are  among  the  highest  in
the  world. For  example,  the  share  of  both  imports  and  exports  in  domestic-3-
output  were  lower  in  1988  than  they  were  in  1979. These  observations  are
contrary  to  the  belief  that  import  intensity  of  production  has  increased  as  a
result  of  the  liberalization  attempts.  Thus,  the  experience  of  the  1980s  has
to  be  analyzed  carefully  to  place  the  developments  in  an  appropriate  context
so  that  the  discussions  for  future  policies  can  be  based  on  better
information.
4.  The  Indian  trade  regime  has  been  comprehensively  analyzed  by  Bhagwati
and  Srinivasan  (1975),  Ponchamukhi  (1978),  Rao  (1985)  and  more  recently  by
Pursell  (1988).  More  specific  work  on  imports  and  exports,  with  the  exception
of  the  study  by  Wolf  (1982)  have  focused  on  the  response  of  exports  to
relative  price  changes.  These  include  Reidel,  Hall  and  Grawe  (1984),  Lucas
(1988,  1989),  Ram  and  Rath  (1989)  and  Virmani  (1990).  Of  these,  Lucas  (1988)
developed  a  general  equilibrium  model  where  disaggregated  import,  export  and
output  behavior  is  estimated  basically  with  data  from  the  1970s.  More
recently  Virmani  (1990)  estimated  more  aggregative  import  and  export
equations.  The  results  of  all  these  studies,  despite  different  time  periods
and  estimation  methods,  clearly  indicate  that  both  exports  and  imports  are
highly  responsive  to  relative  prices.
5.  The  work  on  industrial  output  has  focused  more  on  the  relative
stagnation  of  output  and  productivity  in  the  1970s  and  its  acceleration  in  the
1980s  (Ahluwalia  (1985,  1991),  Goldar  and  Renghanathan  (1990),  Kelkar  and
Kumar  (1990)  and  Nagaraj  (1989)).  The  turnaround  has  been  attributed  to
policy  changes,  expansionary  macroeconomic  policies  and  improvements  in  infra-
structure.  Again,  although  each  study  emphasizes  different  aspects  of  the
structural  change  in  the  1980s,  almost  all  of  them  agree  that  the  pace  of
industrial  growth  has  accelerated.
6.  These  two  strands  of  analysis  indicate  that  the  policy  environment  has
changed  in  the  1980s,  but  have  not  systematically  analyzed  the  components  of
these  changes  and  their  interaction  with  the  key  variables.  7he  purpose  of
this  study  is  to  integrate  policy  developments  with  the  behavior  of  trade  and
output  behavior.  It  tries  to  evaluate  the  experience  of  the  last  two  decudes
by  highlighting  the  major  changes  in  policies  that  determine  the  incentive
framework  and  their  impact  on  manufacturing  imports,  exports  and  output.  The-4-
purpose  of  the  study  is  not  to  develop  an  integrated  model  but  to  describe
main  developments  in  a  more  comprehensive  manner.  The  simple  ecanometric
estimates  used  in  the  text  are  only  to  illustrate  the  basic  stylized
relationships  as  they  relate  to  the  manufacturing  sector.
7.  The  analysis  and  the  results  indicate  that  the  Real  Effective  Exchange
Rate  (REER)  has  been  one  of  the  most  important  determinants  of  Indian  imports
and  exports.  On  the  export  side,  export  incentives  have  also  played  an
important  role. On  the  import  side,  real  exchange  rates,  together  with  import
tariffs,  have  determined  the  allocation  of  demand  for  manufactured  products
domestic  and  imported  goods.  The  overall  level  of  demand  for  manufactured
products  and  their  output  has  been  driven  primarily  by  the  growth  of  public
expenditure.  The  import  regimes,  restrictive  and  more  liberal,  have
contributed  to  the  supply  side  response  to  aggregate  demand.  Increases  in
tariff  rates  have  more  than  compensated  for  the  relaxation  in  import  policies.
The  net  result  of  these  policies  has  been  a  pattern  of  industrialization  based
on  import  substitution  and  financed  largely  by  foreign  savings.  Despite
attempts  to  liberalize  the  trade  regime,  share  of  trade  in  domestic  output  has
actually  shrunk  during  the  1980s.
B.  EXPORTS,  IMPORTS  AND  MANUFACTURING  OUTPUT
8.  This  section  sumarizes  the  behavior  of  exports,  imports  and
manufacturing  output,  for  the  period  1970/71 to  1987/88,  by  focusing  on  the
behavior  of  exchange rates,  import  taxes  and government  spending  growth  which
jointly  determine  the  structure  of  incentives  in  India.
(a)  Exp2rts
9.  India's  export  performance  in  the  last  two  decades  has  not  been
impressive.  Its  share  of  world  exports  has  declined  from  0.98%  in  1964/65  to
only  0.45%  in  1987/88.  Its  share  of  world  manufactured  exports  has  declined
from  0.65%  to  around  0.4%  during  the  same  period  (see  Figure  1). Exports
stagnated  during  the  first  half  of  the  1980s,  averaging  only  around  0.4%  p.a.
growth  rate  for  the  1979/80-1985/86  period,  and  declined  as  a  percentage  of-5-
GDP.  This  decline  was  reversed  in  the  last  two  years,  with  total  exports
growing  at  13.5%  per  annum,  led  by  a  large  increase  in  manufactui-cd  exports
where  growth  averaged  around  19%  annually.  The  acceleration  in  growth  was  not
large  enough  to  recoup  the  sha-e  of  world  markets  lost  over  the  last  decade.
The  relatively  modest  performance  in  exports  can  be  attributed  to  the  fact
that  the  Indian  Government  has  not  traditionally  placed  much  emphasis  on
exports  which  have  usually  been  undertaken  as  a  marginal  activity  and  only
actively  promoted  during  periods  of  slackening  domestic  demand  or  when  there
were  balance  of  payments  pressures  to  earn  more  foreign  exchange.
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10.  Despite  the  fact  that  India  has  traditionally  been  a  largely  agrarian
economy,  its  exports  (in  real  tems) have  been  increasingly  dominated  by
manufactured  goods  throughout  the  last  two  decades.  In  1962163w  manufactured
and  primary  exports  each  made  up  roughly  50%  of  total  exports.  In  1987/88,
manufactured  exports  had  increased  their  share  to  65l. Between  1960/61  and
1987/88,  total  real  exports  grew  at  an  annual  average  rate  of  4.4t,  while
manufactured  exports  grew  at  5.2%  and  primary  exports  grew  at  only  3.4%.-6-
11.  Indian  exports  are  found  to  be  very  sensitive  to  the  real  eifective
exchange  rate. The  following  discussio:  divides  1970/71  to  1987/88  i.nto  four
periods  according  to  exchange  rate  movements  and  the  corresponding  export
performances.  The  period  1970/71-1974/75  showed  moderate  growth  for  total
exports  of  around  6%  p.a.  with  manufactured  exports  growing  at  over  6%  p.a.
compared  to  the  primary  export  growth  rate  of  around  5.4%. However,  this
total  export  performance  was  not  very  impressive  in  terms  of  its  share  in
world  exports,  as  the  percentage  steadily  declined  from  0.63%  in  1970/71  to
0.51%  in  1974/75.
12.  A  major  turn-around  occurred  between  1975  and  1979  when  the  REER
depreciated  by  around  30%. This  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate,  steady
increases  in  total  export  subsidies  and  the  existence  of  under-utilized
capacity  in  the  manufacturing  sector  contributed  to  rapid  growth  of  manu-
factured  exports.  Manufactured  exports  grew  at  an  annual  average  rate  of
close  to  24%  in  1974/75-1976/77,  which,  together  with  a  primary  export  annual
average  growth  rate  of  around  8.6%,  resulted  in  a  total  real  export  growth
rate  of  nearly  17%. Between  1977/78-1978/79  the  REER  continued  to  depreciate,
but  manufactured  exports  increased  only  slightly,  while  primary  exports
actually  declined.  Primary  exports  fell  by  22%  in  1978,  brought  about  largely
by  a  20%  drop  in  food  and  animal  exports.
13.  Between  1978/79  and  1984/85,  the  REER  appreciated.  This,  together  with
declining  export  subsidies,  led  to  export  stagnation.  For  the  period
1979/80-1985/86  total  exports  grew  around  0.4%  p.a.  while  manufactured  exports
only  grew  around  1.2%  p.a.  and  primary  exports  actually  declined  at  around
0.7%  per  annum.
14.  Over  the  last  few  years,  1984/85-1987/88,  there  has  been  a  steep  depre-
ciation  such  that  the  REER  reached  its  lowest  point  since  1970/71.  At  the
same  time,  there  was  a sharp  increase  in  total  export  subsidies.  Specific
steps  were  taken  to  streamline  export  administration.  The  effect  of  these
policy  changes  was  finally  felt  in  1986/87  and  1987/88,  when  export  growth
accelerated  dramatically.  For  1985/86-1987/88,  manufactured  exports  grew  at
an  annual  average  rate  of  around  19%,  primary  exports  at  around  5.4%,
resulting  in  over  13%  annual  average  rate  of  growth  for  total  exports.-7-
15.  Structure  of  Exports.  India's  export  products  range  from  those  produced
primarily  for  export  to  those  exported  at  the  margin  after  domestic  demand  has
been  satisfied.  According  to  this  classification,  India's  exports  can  be
divided  into  three  categories.  Category  A  consists  of  goods  produced  almost
entirely  for  exports  (gems  and  jewelry,  marine  products,  etc.)  and  goods  for
which  production  for  export  market  is,  for  all  practical  purposes,  separated
from  production  for  the  home  market  (such  as  garments,  carpets  and
handicrafts).  Category  B  consists  of  traditional  exports  in  which  a
proportion  ranging  between  20%  and  60%  of  total  output  is  exported  (these
include  mostly  raw  material  based  products  such  as  jute  manufactures,  leather
and  leather  manufactures,  tea,  coffee,  etc.).  Category  C is  non-traditional
manufactured  exports  in  which  around  10%  or  less  of  total  output  is  exported,
(textiles,  machinery,  transport  equipment,  metal  and  steel  manufactures,
chemicals,  sugar  and  oilcakes  and  most  consumer  goods).  Table  1  presents
these  three  categories  of  exports  as  shares  of  GDP.
TABLE  1:  MJOR  CATEGORIES  OF EXPORTS
1970/71  1975/76  1980/81  195i.86  1986/81
Share  Share  Share  Share  Share  Share  Share  Share  Share  Share
of  of  of  of  of  of  of  of  of
ErgO2rts  GOP  Exports  GOP  Eximorts  GDP  Exports  GDP  ExDorts  soP
Category A  25.97  1.10  30.91  1.57  44.65  2.40  45.01  1.98  47.04  2.26
Category B  39.45  1.67  31.27  1.59  27.38  1.47  26.50  1.17  26.93  1.29
Category C  34.58  1.47  37.82  1.92  27.97  1.51  28.48  1.26  26.03  1.25
Total  100.00  4.24  100.00  5.07  100.00  5.38  100.00  4.41  100.00  4.80
Source:  Report on Currency and Finance. RBI. various  issues.
16.  Category A exports,  products  exclusively  for  export,  show the  largest
increase  over  time. Starting  from  around  26%  of  total  exports  in  1970/71,
category  A exports  grew  to  around  47%  in  1986/87,  making  up  the  largest  share
at  that  time. This  could  reflect  that  most  government  efforts  to  promote
exports  have concentrated  on export-oriented  industries,  or  that  the  exchange
rate  policy  has  the  largest  effect  on  these  exports.  Changes  in  domestic
demand  have  little  effect  on  such  exports  since  they  are  produced  almost
exclusively  for  export  purposes.  Gems  and  jewelry  have  been  the  rising  star-8-
of  this  export  category.  The  share  of  gems  in  manufactured  exports  has  risen
from  around  4%  in  1969/70  to  around  21-22%  in  the  last  two  years.  For  the
period  1969/70-1985/86,  gems  averaged  an  annual  growth  rate  of  16%,  compared
to  4%  for  all  manufactured  exports.
17.  Exports  in  the  B  category  (Jute,  coft..  e,  tea,  etc.)  show  the  largest
decline  as  a  share  of  total  exports,  from  around  41%  in  1970/71  to  around  27%
in  1986/87.  This  is  despite  the  fact  that  among  this  group,  leather  exports
have  increased  significantly.  Supply  shortages  and  increasing  domestic  demand
probably  explain  this  decline.
18.  Category  C  exports  show  a  decline  both  in  terms  of  shares  of  exports  and
shares  of  GDP.  Capital  goods  and  other  manufactures  make  up  the  largest  share
of  category  C  exports,  and  they  are  sensitive  to  changes  in  domestic  demand:
should  domestic  demand  increase,  these  goods  would  be  diverted  away  from  the
export  market  to  meet  domestic  needs.  The  generally  lower  share  of  category  C
exports  in  the  1980s,  compared  to  the  1970s,  could  be  the  result  of  the
greater  domestic  needs  evidenced  in  the  higher  rate  of  growth  of  industrial
output.  It  is  also  due  to  the  fact  that  the  policy  environment  makes  it  very
difficult  to  export  such  goods.
19.  Despite  significant  attempts  to  diversify  exports  and  very  rapid  growth
of  engineering  industries,  their  share  in  exports  have  declined  during  the
1980s.  Thus,  in  1988,  India's  exports  were  reduced  to  a  few  simple  product
groups  that  either  had  easy  and  duty  free  access  to  imported  inputs  (e.g.,
gems)  or  relied  heavily  on  domestic  inputs  that  are  abundant  and  priced  below
world  prices  (e.g.,  cotton  textiles  and  leather  products).l/  More  complicated
products  requiring  multiple  and  complex  inputs  are  penalized  by  very  high
input  and  capital  costs  as  well  as  a  very  restrictive  import  regime.  Although
India  has  a  full  set  of  schemes  to -iport  exports  and  compensate  for  effects
of  protection  and  indirect  taxes,  the  complexity  of  the  import  and  tax  systems
have  rendered  them  ineffective  except  for  very  simple  products.
1/  Both  cotton  and  raw  hides  exports  are  restricted  leading  to  lower  input  costs
for  downstream  users.-9-
20.  Export  Equations.  Simple  equations  estimated  separately  for  total  and
manufactured  exports  are  preientezd  below.  These  reinforce  the  findings  in
earlier  studies  that  exports  are  highly  sensitive  to  relative  prices.
21.  It  should  be  pointed  ouw  that  there  are  serious  measurement  problems  in
deriving  real  export  series.  The  price  deflators  for  some  product  groups  are
highly  suspect,  leading  to  unreliable  real  export  series.  These  problems  are
less  serious  tor  large  aggregates  such  as  total  manufacturing  or  total
exports.  However,  as  soon  as  export  categories  are  narrowed  down,  the  errors
introduced  by  price  series  increase  significantly.  Therefore,  estimates  for
different  categories  of  exports  (i.e.,  A,B,C)  are  not  nresented.  First,
problems  with  price  series  become  more  serious.  Second  and  more  important,
due  to  vent-for-surplus  nature  of  some  exports,  the  shifts  in  individual
categories  are  large.  For  example,  exports  of  sugar  on  a  large  scale  have
taken  place  in  years  of  excess  output,  which  by  itself  increases  category  B
exports  by  more  than  25X  those  years.  Similarly,  steel  exports  during  the
late  1970s  when  there  were  excess  supplies  led  to  large  increases  in
category  C exports.  Finally,  although  demand  and  supply  equations  were
estimated  simultaneously,  only  reduced  forms  are  presented  above  to  illustrate
the  nature  of  relationships.
22.  Figure  2 illustrates  the  relationship  between  total  real  exports  (in
1980/81 prices)  and REER  (adjusted  for  export  incentives  and taxes)  over  the
1971-1988  period.
FIG.  2  TOTAL EXPORTS AND  REERS
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23.  Various  formulations  of  a  total  export  function  were  estimated.  The
best  function  fitted  to  explain  total  exports  is  a  reduced  form  function
containing  both  supply  and  demand  factors.  These  include  domestic  demand,
world  demand  and  the  real  effective  exchange  rate. On  the  supply  side,  the
change  in  domestic  demand  is  important.  On  the  demand  side,  world  demand  is
important.  The  real  effective  exchange  rate  is  a  combined  measure  of  relative
prices  on  the  demand  and  supply  sides.  Exporters  respond  to  relative  export
to  domestic  price  - the  higher  the  relative  price,  the  more  exporters  would
supply.  On  the  demand  side,  importers  of  Indian  exports  respond  to  relative
world  to  Indian  export  price.  The  higher  is  this  relative  price,  the  more
importers  would  demand  of  Indian  exports.  The  real  effective  exchange  rate  is
the  multiplicative  product  of  these  two  relative  prices  for  India  with  respect
to  its  trading  partners  weighted  by  their  trade  shares  with  India.  Thus,  the
real  effective  exchange  rate  reflects  relative  price  effects  on  both  the
demand  and  supply  side. The  function  is  estimated  in  first  difference  of  logs
(growth  rate)  form  (hence  all  the  variables  begin  with  'D').  The  figures  in
parenthesis  are  t-statistics.
(1)  DQXTT  =  0.036  - 0.80  DTXREERA  + 0.40  DQXWD  - 0.73  DGDPMP
(-4.68)  (1.28)  (-1.98)
Adj.  R2  =  0.63
D.W.  =  2.15
where  QXTT  =  total  exports;  TXREERA  = total  export-weighted  REER  adjusted  by
net  export  incentives  (export  subsidies  less  taxes);  QXWD  =  total  world
exports;  and  GDPMP  = GDP  in  market  prices,  a  proxy  for  domestic  demand.
24.  The  adjusted  R-squared  is  0.63,  which  is  a  reasonably  good  fit  given
that  the  function  relates  growth  rates  rather  than  levels.  The  change  in  the
real  effective  exchange  rate  has  a significant  effect  on  the  growth  rate  of
total  exports;  the  t-statistic  is  4.68. The  price  elasticity  is  0.8.
Domestic  demand  ias  a  negative  effect  on  total  exports,  with  a  coefficient  of
0.73. This  reflects  the  supply-constrained  nature  of  exports  in  India.  When
domestic  demand  exceeds  supply,  exports  are  diverted  from  the  foreign  market- 11  -
towards  meeting  domestic  needs.  On  the  other  hand,  when  domestic  demand  is
lagging,  then  the  excess  supply  is  exported  on  a  marginal  cost  basis.
Finally,  foreign  demand  has  a  smaller  and  less  significant  effect  on  exports,
with  an  elasticity  of  0.4  and  a  t-statistic  of  only  1.28. This  is  due  to  the
marginal  nature  of  most  of  Indian's  exports,  as  well  as  the  small  share  of
Indian  exports  in  the  world  market.
25.  Structural  functions  were  estimated  for  manufactured  export  supply  and
demand.  On  the  supply  side,  domestic  demand,  availability  of  foreign
exchange,  manufactured  export  subsidies  and  the  relative  export  to  domestic
price  were  found  to  be  significant.  On  the  demand  side,  relative  export  to
world  price  was  found  to  be  significant.  The  function  finally  chosen  is  a
reduced  form  function  which  consists  of  both  supply  and  demand  factors.
Again,  as  in  the  case  for  total  exports,  the  function  was  estimated  in  first
difference  of  logs  (that  is,  growth  rate)  form,  as  follows:
(2)  DQXMT  =  0.188  - 1.05  DMFXREERA(-1)  - 0.022  RESMO(-1)  - 1.06  DGDPMF(-1)
(-3.84)  (-2.11)  (-2.02)
AdJ.  R2  = 0.54;  D.W.  = 2.39
where  QXMT  = manufactured  exports;  MFXREERA  =  manufactured  export-weighted
REER  adjusted  by  export  incentives;  RESMO  = reserves  in  months  of  imports  and
GDPMF  =  manufacturing  GDP.
26.  The  function  explains  over  half  of  the  growth  rate  of  manufactured
exports,  with  the  adjusted  R-squared  being  0.54. The  real  effective  exchange
rate  is  a  measure  of  combined  price  effects  on  both  the  supply  and  the  demand
sides.  It  is  founi  to  be  very  significant  with  an  elasticity  of  1.05.
Foreign  exchange  reserves  measured  in  terms  of  months  of  imports  were  found  to
have  a significant  negative  effect  on  manufactured  exports.  The  is  probably
because  when  foreign  exchange  reserves  are  low,  the  Government  eases
administrative  controls  faced  by  exporters  and  exhorts  enterprises  to  export
more. Lagged  domestic  output  has  a  negative  relationship  with  exports
indicating  that  higher  domestic  demand  leads  firms  to  shift  from  the  export  to- 12  -
the  domestic  market.  Finally,  world  demand  was  found  not  to  have  an  effect  on
Indian  manufactured  export  growth,  implying  that  constraints  on  manufactured
exports  are  primarily  due  to  supply  rather  than  demand  factors.
(b)  Imports
27.  Indian  imports  can be classified  into  three  major  categories  according
to  their  determinants.  First,  there  are  imports  including  food,  petroleum  and
fertilizers  which  are  determined  by  agricultural  output,  by  domesthL  petroleum
production,  or  by  decisions  on  fertilizer  imports.  The  Government  allocates
the  available  foreign  exchange  first  to  meet  the  needs  for  these  imports.
Second,  there  are  imports  including  capital  goods  and  other  manufactures;
undertaken  only  after  these  exogenous  import  requirements  are  satisfied.
These  imports  are  sensitive  to  exchange  rates  and  tariffs.  Given  the  exchange
rate  and  tariffs,  if  demand  for  such  imports  exceeds  supply  of  foreign
exchange,  then  import  restrictions  are  placed  on  them. Finally,  imports  of
gems  and  jewelry  fall  under  a  unique  category,  since  they  solely  cater  to
exports,  and  are  a function  of  gem  and  jewelry  exports.
TABLE  2: REAL  IMPORTS  AS  A  SHARE  OF  GDP  AND  PERIOD  GROWTH  RATES
1962-66  1967-70  1971-7 4 1975-77  1978-81  1982-88
rarvm  6romt  6rowth  6rofth  - rowth  browth
5bare  Rate  Share  Rate  Share  Rate  Share  Rate  Share  Rate  share  rate
Total  10.16 9.46  8.41  3.04  7.40  9.81  7.29  -0.77  8.13 10.19  7.94  3.18
Food  &  Animals  1.97  20.92  2.25  4.82  0.87  0.01  1.39  1.51  0.75 -2.53  0.77  1.76
Fuels  & Lubricants  1.51  -2.63  1.36  1.87  2.82  25.03  2.42  9.58  3.29 15.83  2.63 -1.15
Gems  & Jewelry  0.01  1.22  0.05  3.73  0.06  32.83  0.13 56.31  0.34 -5.12  0.37 14.94
Capital  Goods  3.19  7.21  1.91  -6.19  1.30  5.32  1.20 9.43  1.20  5.69  1.55 9.55
Other  Manufactures  3.48 -1.26  2.85 -3.04  2.35 -1.69  2.15  -22.93  2.55 11.32  2.62  2.87
Source: Report  on Currency  and  Finance,  RBI,  various  issues.
28.  Table  2  shows  the  share  of  real  imports  in  GDP  and  period  growth  rates
for  various  import  categories.  Import  composition  and  growth  rates  have
changed  substantially  over  the  last  two  decades.  These  changes  have  resulted
either  from  shocks  (such  as  draughts  and  oil  price  increases)  that  increase
the  proportion  of  essential  imports  or  from  import  policy  changes.  The- 13  -
following  discussion  divides  1960/61  to  1987/88  into  roughly  four  periods,
each  distinguished  by  the  performance  of  reports  which  was  Influenced  by  the
particular  import  regime  at  that  time.
29.  The  period  between  1960/61  to  1965/66,  was  characterized  by  buoyant
investment  growth  in  manufacturing,  especially  by  the  public  sector
(8.15%  p.a.  and  11.72%  p.a.  respectively)  and  the  share  of  manufactured  goods
imports  (especially  capital  goods  imports)  was  high  relative  to  investment  and
output.  Although  growth  in  manufactured  goods  imports  was  lower  than  that  of
output,  the  share  of  imports  was  quite  high  (almost  50%  in  1962).  Throughout
this  period,  the  import  control  mechanisms  were  increasingly  tightened,  but
were  still  inadequate  to  counter  an  impending  foreign  exchange  crisis.  The
outcome  was  the  nominal  devaluation  of  the  rupee  in  June,  1966,  followed  by  a
partial  and  halting  import  liberalization,  consisting  mostly  of  the  relaxation
of  import  licensing  and  reduced  import  duties.  These  reforms  were,  however,
short-lived,  and  the  foreign  exchange  situation  not  only  did  not  improve,  but
in  fact  deteriorated,  due  to  two  consecutive  years  of  drought  and  inflation
which  wiped  out  the  effects  of  the  devaluation.
30.  Between  1965/66  to  1976/77  the  import  regime  got  progressively  more
restrictive  and  complex.  Attempts  were  made  to  contain  balance  of  payments
difficulties  by  increasing  tariffs  and  tightening  quantitative  restrictions.
Tariff  collection  rates  on  manufactured  products  were  increased  from  less  than
30%  in  1969  to  more  than  50%  by  1973. The  import  premia  on  REP  licenses  shot
up  to  more  than  100%  despite  the  tariff  increases.  The  tightening  of  the
import  regime  was  accompanied  by  further  restrictions  on  investment  licensing.
There  was  a  period  of  relaxation  between  1970/71-1973/74,  where  imports
rebounded  partially,  only  to  be  reversed  in  1974-75.  These  were  the  years
immediately  before  and  during  the  first  oil  crisis.  The  decline  in  imports  in- 14  -
1974/75  was  actually  a  policy  reaction  to  the  inflationary  tendencies2/  which
were  already  accumulating  in  the  economy  prior  to  the  onset  of  the  first  oil
crisis.  The  import  policy  focused  on  selective  imports  of  key  consumer  goods
in  short  supply  (such  as  foodgrains,  edible  oils  and  fibers)  to  ease  infla-
tionary  pressures  during  1974/75  and  1975/76.  Imports  of  food  and  animals  (as
a  percentage  of  GDP)  increased,  imports  of  fuels  and  manufactured  goods
declined.  After  the  cutback  in  1974/75,  real  imports  remained  at  more  or  less
the  same  level  until  1976/77,  registering  an  annual  average  growth  rate  of
around  1%  for  the  1974/75-1976/77  period.  In  1975  the  exchange  rate  started
to  be  depreciated  and  by  1978/79,  it  had  depreciated  by  30%  in  real  effective
terms.  The  depreciation  eliminated  some  of  the  premia  on  imports,  and  exports
responded  by  increasing  rapidly  until  1978/79.  Increasing  exports,  tight
imports,  low  investment  and  increasing  workers  remittances  improved  the  level
of  reserves  and  the  Government  in  1977/78  began  a  partial  liberalization
policy  of  relaxing  the  import  controls.
31.  This  import  liberalization  phase  was  aided  by  the  two  bumper  harvests  in
1977/78  and  1978/79,  as  well  as  an  unanticipated  growth  of  private
remittances,  both  of  which  led  to  the  accumulation  of  food  and  foreign
exchange  reserves.  It  was  in  the  face  of  these  growing  reserves,  as  well  as
pressure  from  constituencies  in  industrial  areas  where  output,  profits  and
employment  were  being  disrupted  by  recurring  raw  material  shortages,  that  the
Indian  Government  began  to  relax  import  controls  and  quantitative
restrictions.  This  resulted  in  high  real  import  growth  which  averaged  around
11%  p.a.  between  1977/78  and  1980/81.
2/  Before  the  onset  of  the  first  oil  shock  in  1973,  the  peak  agricultural
harvest  of  1970/71  was  followed  by  a  slight  reduction  in  1971/72  and  a
severe  drought  in  1972-73  when  real  income  originating  in  agriculture
declined  by  6.36%.  The  influx  of  refugees  from  what  was  then  East
Pakistan,  resulting  in  the  creation  of  Bangladesh  in  1971  led  to  a  steep
rise  in  defense  expenditure.  Consequently,  the  annual  rate  of  inflation
as  measured  by  the  WPI  accelerated  progressively  from  2%  around  April
1971  to  about  17%  by  September  1973,  the  beginning  of  the  oil  price
hike.- 15  -
32.  In  contrast  to  the  decline  following  the  first  oil  shock,  total  real
imports  increased  in  the  aftermath  of  the  second  oil  shock.  These  different
policy  responses  were  primarily  due  to  the  different  initial  conditions.  By
the  eve  of  the  second  oil  shock,  the  Indian  economy  had  built  up  quite  a  bit
of  reserves,  both  in  food  and  in  foreign  exchange,  and  the  policy  response  at
the  onset  of  the  crisis  was  continued  liberalization  of  imports  for  the
purpose  of  promoting  efficiency  as  well  as  continued  imports  of  food,  edible
oil  and  fibers  to  curb  inflationary  pressures.  Real  capital  and  intermediate
goods  imports  increased  by  25.8%  and  20.1%  respectl  ly  in  1980/81.  Imports
of  fuels  and  lubricants  increased  by  close  to  10%  in  real  terms  in  that  same
year. Food  and  animal  imports  increased  by  nearly  50%  in  real  terms  due  to
the  drought  of  1980.
33.  Since  1980/81,  the  share  of  exogenous  imports  (food  and  fuels)  has
declined  while  the  share  of  manufacturing  imports  has  increased.  Food  imports
have  fallen  by  nearly  half  as  a  share  of  GDP  from  1971  to  1988,  a  reflection
of  improved  supply  conditions.  Real  imports  of  fuel  showed  a  generally
declining  trend  as  the  supply  conditions  eased  with  domestic  discoveries  of
oil  and  gas.
34.  Despite  the  liberalization  attempts,  real  import  growth  only  averaged
around  5%  per  annum  for  the  1980/81-1987/88  period,  in  part  due  to  the  depre-
ciation  of  the  rupee  and  in  part  to  large  increases  in  import  tariffs.  The
share  of imports  to  GDP,  although  slightly  higher  than  the  levels  observed  in
the  1970s,  have  declined  in  the  late  1980s.- 16  -
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35.  Manufacturina  Imports.  Figure  3  shows  the  two  components  of
,,anufactured  goods  (capital  and  intermediate  goods)  in  1980/81  prices.  There
was  an  acceleration  in  the  growth  of  capital  goods  imports  in  the  1980s.  From
1981/82  onwards,  real  imports  of  capital  goods  increased  at  a  trend  rate  of
around  5X  per  annum,  though  with  some  fluctuations.  The  large  increase  in
1985/86  and  1986/87  is  due  to  sharp  reduction  in  capital  goods  tariffs  (from
around  lOOX  to  first  45%  and  then  to  55X). This  abated  by  1987/88,  reflecting
the  reduction  of  pent-up  demand,  some  tightening  of  restrictions  in  response
to  pressure  from  domestic  suppliers,  and  the  unification  of  tariffs  on  capital
goods  imports  at  a  higher  average  level  (90X).
36.  Imports  of  other  manufactures  followed  a  generally  declining  growth
trend  until  the  1980s  when  there  was  a  dramatic  increase.  This  coincided  with
the  beginning  of  the  import  liberalization  phase,  but  also  reflects  a  stock
adjustment  In  response  to  lifting  the  more  stringent  restrictions  on  these
Imports'.  She  decline  in  1986/87  and  1987/88  coincides  with  the  increasing
tariffs  and  depreciating  exchange  rate  that  increased  import  prices  relative
to  domestic  prices.- 17
37.  The  real  exchange  rate  and  tariff  levels  have  had  an  important  effect  on
manufacturing  imports.  The  level  of  economic  activity  determines  the  overall
level  of  demand  for  manufactured  goods,  but  the  decision  to  import  or  use
local  supplies  depends  on  the  prices  of  imports  relative  to  domestic  prices.
The  average  tariff  collection  rate  (a  proxy  for  tariff  production)  has
increased  dramatically  from  about  20%  in  1970  to  63%  in  1988. Average  tariff
collection  rates  on  manufactured  products  have  increased  from  less  than  50%  in
1979  to  more  than  70%  (80%  excluding  duty-free  imports)  in  1988. Figures  4
and  5  Illustrate  the  relationship  between  share  of  imports  and  relative  price
of  capital  and  intermediate  goods.
38.  Figure  4 shows  the  share  of  capital  goods  imports  in  gross  fixed
investment  in  machinery  (both  in  1980/81  prices)  and  the  price  of  imported
capital  goods  (inclusive  of  tariffs)  relative  to  the  domestic  wholesale  price
index  of  capital  goods  (inclusive  of  domestic  excise  taxes).  The  relative
price  is  standardized  to  be  100  in  1980/81.  The  left  axis  measures  the
relative  shares;  right  axis  measures  the  relative  prices.- 18  -
FIG. 4  RELATIVE SHARES  AND  PRICES  OF  IMPORTED CAPITAL  GOODS
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39.  The  graph  indicates  that  the  decision  on  whether  to  use  domestic  or
imported  capital  goods  is  quite  sensitive  to  the  relative  prices  of  capital
goods.  The  share  of  imported  capital  good  in  total  investment  in  machinery
and  equipment  has  fallen  from  about  50%  in  1961  to  20%  in  1971  and  to  only  13%
in  1988  mirroring  the  Increases  in  import  prices.  Since  1981  the  index  of
relative  import  prices  rose  from  100  to  almost  150. More  than  60%  of  this
increase  resulted  from  higher  import  tariffs  relative  to  domestic  taxes;  the- 1g  -
other  40%  came  from  real  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate.3/  Competition  in
many  areas  of  capital  goods  industry  has  not  allowed  domestic  producers  to
increase  their  prices  in  line  with  increases  in  import  prices.
40.  Imports  of  capital  goods  are  modelled  as  a function  of  relative  import
to  domestic  prices,  the  import  duty  on  capital  goods,  as  well  as  the  final
domestic  demand  for  capital  goods  (here  gross  fixed  investment  in  machinery  is
used  as  a  proxy)4/.  An  alternative  specification  was  also  attempted  which
included  domestic  excise  duty  on  the  capital  goods  side. This  was  found  to  be
insignificant,  probably  because  there  was  very  little  movement  in  the  domestic
excise  duty  compared  with  the  import  duty. The  function  is  estimated  in  first
difference  of  logs  (growth  rate)  form,  as  follows:
(3)  DQMKG  = 0.01  + 1.16  DGFIMH  - 0.80  DRPKGWOT(-1)  - 0.57  DKGDUTY
(3.05)  (-2.98)  (-4.46)
AdJ.  R2  = 0.79;  D.W.  = 2.34
where  QMKG  =  imports  of  capital  goods;  GFIMH  = gross  fixed  investment  in
machinery;  RPKGWOT  = relative  import  to  domestic  prices  of  capital  goods
before  taxes;  and  KGDUTY  = import  duty  on  capital  goods.
41.  The  function  explains  changes  in  capital  goods  imports  very  well,  with
an  adjusted  R-squared  of  0.79  which  is  very  high  for  a  first  difference
equation.  All  the  coefficients  are  very  significant,  with  high  t-statistics.
The strong  effect  of  relative  prices  and import  tariffs  on imports  of  capital
3/  The  average  tariff  rates  on  machinery  have  increased from  about  30%  in
the  late  1970s  to  almost  70%  in  1988. The  decline  in  relative  prices  in
1985/86  is  due  to  reduction  in  tariffs  for  project  imports  to  45%.
Tariff  rates  were  subsequently  raised  to  55%  in  1986/87  and  to  90%  in
1987/88.  Currently  they  are  80%.
4/  This  is  strictly  only  an  import  demand  function.  Given  that  India's
imports  of  these  goods  make  up  only  a  very  small  share  of  the  world
market,  it  can  be  safely  assumed  that  India  faces  a  perfectly  elastic
supply  function.- 20  -
goods  is  thus  supported  by  econometric  evidence.  The  price  elacticity  is  0.8
and  the  demand  elasticity  is  1.16. Import  duty  has  a  significant  negative
effect  on  capital  goods  imports,  with  an  elasticity  of  around  0.6.
FIG. 5  RELATIVE SHARES  AND  PRICES  OF  IMPORTED INTERMEDIATES
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42.  A similar  picture  emerges  when the  share  of  imported  in  Indian-made
intermediates  is  examined.  Figure  5 plots  the  share of  intermediate  goods
imports  to  domestic  production  of  intermediates  on the  left  axis  and the
relative  prices  of  imported  intermediates  (inclusive  of  tariffs)  to  domestic
prices  of  similar  goods  (inclusive  of.excises)  on  the  right  axis. It  shows
that  the  relative  prices  of  imports  to  domestic  prices  have  increased,
especially  in  the  late  1980s,  and  the  relative  share  of  imports  has  declined.
About  70%  of  this  relative  price  change  results  from  an  increase  in  tariffs  on
intermediates  (from  52%  in  1981  to  80%  in  1988).  The  rapid  rise  in  the  share
of  imports  after  1976/77  reflects  the  relaxation  of  QRs  with  the  1977/78- 21  -
Import  Policy  Order.  As  of  1988,  imports  of  intermediates  have  narrowed  to
the  few  product  groups  which  are  either  not  available  in  India  or  whose
domestic  supply  has  not  caught  up  with  demand.
43.  Imports  of  intermediate  goods  are  modelled  as  a function  of  relative
import  to  domestic  prices,  import  duty  on  intermediate  goods  and  manufacturing
output  which  represents  the  domestic  demand  for  intermediate  imports.  As  in
the  case  for  capital  goods  imports,  this  is  an  import  demand  function  as  one
can  safely  assume  that  the  import  supply  of  intermediate  goods  facing  India  is
perfectly  elastic.  The  function  is  estimated  in  first  difference  of  logs
(growth  rate)  form,  as  follows:
(4)  DQMOT-0.04  - 1.53  DRPOTWOT  - 0.55  DRPOTWOT(-1)  - 0.9  DOTDUTY  +  1.48  DGDPMF
(-4.01)  (-1.44)  (-3.72)  (1.94)
AdJ.  R2  = 0.68;  D.W.  =  1.93
where  QMOT  =  imports  of  intermediate  goods;  RPOTWOT  =  relative  import  to
domestic  price  of  intermediate  goods  before  taxes;  OTDUTY  =  import  duty  on
intermediate  goods;  GDPMF  = manufacturing  GDP.
44.  The  function  explains  changes  in  intermediate  goods  imports  very  well,
with  an  adjusted  R-squared  of  around  0.7. Again,  as  in  the  case  of  capital
goods  imports,  relative  prices  and  import  duty  have  a  large  impact  on
intermediate  goods  imports.  The  short-run  price  elasticity  for  intermediate
goods  imports  is  1.5,  the  long-run  price  elasticity  is  2.1  and  the  demand
elasticity  is  1.5. The  elasticity  of  import  duty  on  intermediate  goods
imports  is  around  1.5.
(c) Behavior  of  Relative  Prices
45.  The  behavior  of  import  to  domestic  prices  suggest  that  the  import  and
domestic  prices  are  not  being  equalized,  at  least  on  the  aggregate  level.
Similarly,  analysis  of  export  to  domestic  prices  suggest  that  they  also  have
increased  during  the  1980s.  Fig.  6  shows  the  ratio  of  import  and export  to
domestic  prices  for  manufactured  products.- 22  -
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The  relative  price  of  imports  is  constructed  by  dividing  the  landed  Import
price  index  of  manufactured  products  (including  average  tariff  collection
rate)  with  the  wholesale  price  index  for  manufactured products  (including
average excise  tax  collection  rate).  Similarly,  relative  price  of  exports  is
the  ratio  of  export  price  index  of  manufactured  products  (including  export
subsidies)  to  wholesale  price  index  for  manufacturing.  All  series  are  stan-
dardized  to  be  100  in  1980/81.
46.  Changes  in  relative  prices  of  exports  show  shifts  in  incentives,  for  a
domestic  producer,  between  selling  in  the  domestic  market  and  exporting.  It
also  indicates  changes  in  the  relative  profitability  of  investing  in  products
sold  in  the  domestic  market  compared  to  products  that  are  exported.  In  the
1980s,  especially  after  1986,  the  relative  profitability  of  exporting  has- 23  -
increased.  This  is  also  consistent  with  the  acLeleration  of  export  growth
after  1986. However,  relative  export  prices  in  1988  had  not  reached  the
levels  obtained  in  the  late  1970s.
47.  Changes  in  relative  price  of  imports  show  the  shifts  in  Incentives  for
importing  or  buying  from  the  domestic  market.  It  also  indicates  the  changes
in  profitability  of  investing  in  import  substituting  industries.  Relative
price  of  imports  has  increased  rapidly  in  the  1980s.5/  One  major  determinant
of  this  increase  has  been  the  increase  In  tariffs  relative  to  domestic  excise
taxes.
48.  Average  tariff  collection  rates  have  increased  from  about  20X  in  1970  to
32Z  in  1978  to  more  than  60X in  1988. Easing  of  entry  barriers  and  rapid
increase  in  total  productivity  has  not  allowed  domestic  producers  to  increase
their  prices  in  line  with  the  increases  in  import  prices.
49.  Comparison  of  relative  prices  of  imports  and  exports  will  indicate  the
profitability  of  investing  in  activities  to  replace  imports  versus  investing
in  products  for  export.  This  ratio  has  moved  in  favor  of  investing  in  import
substitution  activities.  The  main  reason  for  this  change  is  the  greater
increase  in  import  tariffs  compared  to  export  subsidies.  This  development  is
also  consistent  with  the  observation  that  the  bulk  of  new  investments  are
flowing  into  production  of  intermediates,  which  are  currently  imported.
50.  The  increase  in  relative  prices  of  imports  and  exports  implies  that  the
prices  are  not  being  equalized  between  imports,  exports,  and  domestic  output.
This  is  due  to  thi  nature  of  imports,  exports,  and  administrative  pricing  in
India.  The  share  of  manufacturing  exports  in  gross  output  is  very  low  (less
than  5%)  and  exports  are  concentrated  in  a  few  lines  produced  primarily  for
the  foreign  market.  Changes  in  export  prices  do  not  have  a  sizable  effect  on
domestic  prices.  Imports  also  have  similar  characteristics.  If  the  import
penetration  ratios  (import  to  gross  output  ratios)  are  analyzed  in  more
5/  The  relative  import  prices  for  pre-1978  years  should  be  treated  with
caution.  These  years  had  very  high  premia  on  imports  which  are  not
reflected  in  the  official  price  series.  So  in  reality,  relative  import
prices  were  probably  much  higher  than  shown  here.- 24 -
detail,  most  industries  in  Ind1a  have  negligible  imports  either  due  to  QRs  or
tariffs.  Of  the  66  subsectors  within  manufacturing  only  16  have  import  ratios
of  more  than  10%. Of  these,  6  are  in  the  industrial  machinery  sector,  4  in
chemicals,  2  In  metals,  2  in  electrical  appliances  and  electronics,  and  the
other  two  are  paper  products  and  miscellaneous  manufacturing.  Even  within  the
subsectors  that  have  high  import  penetration  ratios,  the  imports  are
concentrated  in  a  few  product  groups  which  are  not  available  in  India.  In
paper  products,  imports  cons4st  of  pulp  and  newsprint  where  India  does  not
have  sufficient  raw  materials  and  imports  were  canalized  and  allocated  to
mills  and  newspapers.  In  inorganic  chemicals,  a  very  large  proportion  of
imports  consists  of  phosphoric  acid,  because  India  does  not  have  indigenous
phosphate  rock. In  the  soaps  and  cosmetics  subsector  (within  chemicals),  palm
oil  constitutes  90%  of  imports.  In  electronics,  the  bulk  of  imports  consists
of  components  for  computers  and  TV  picture  tubes.  Thus  it  is  only  in  organic
chemicals,  synthetic  fibers,  metals,  and  machinery  subsectors  that  there  are
imports  across  a  wide  spectrum  of  products.  Furthermore,  it  is  in  these  three
subsectors  that  the  tariffs  are  very  high  and also  have increased  more than
other  subsectors.  In  addition,  the  items  that  have  significant  imports  are
either  canalized  or  restricted  through  alternative  licensing  procedures.
51.  Another  reason  for  non-equalization  of  domestic  and  import  prices  is  the
implicit  or  explicit  price  controls  and  canalization.  The  public  sector
supplies  a large  portion  of  intermediate  goods  (especially  in  metals  and
chemicals)  and  thus  either  directly  controls  their  prices,  or  controls  the
prices  of  imports  through  public  sector  canalizing  agencies.  Supplies  of  many
of  these  commodities  are  also  rationed  to  actual  users.  Thus,  firms  which
need  more  inputs  (both  imported  and  domestic)  than  are  supplied  by  the
rationing  system  have  to  import  the  difference  (either  directly  or  through  REP
licenses)  at  a  higher  landed  price.- 25 -
52.  For most other  product groups, the share of  imports is  so small that
these  subsectors  can  be  treated  as  essentially  autarkic,  with  prices  being
determined  primarily  by domestic  demand  and supply.6/  The level  of  tariffs
fer  the  few  products  that  are  imported  only  rcetermines  which  products  are
attractive  for  further  import  substitution.  Government  behavior  which  either
places  the  products  with  sufficient  domestic  output  in  the  restrictive  import
categories  or  increases  tariffs  when  international  prices  decline  reinforces
the  autarkic  behavior  in  these  markets.7/  However,  in  subsectors  where  import
ratios  are  higher,  import  prices  do  influence  domestic  prices.
63.  Partial  evidence  for  this  hypothesis  is  given  by  the  behavior  of  prices
of  different  products.  Table  3  shows  the  1987/88  price  indices  of  product
groups  that  have  high  import  penetration  ratios  and  compares  them  to  the
overall  manufacturing  wholesale  price  Index  (WPI).  In  1987/88,  the  WPI  for
manufacturing  was  385  (1970/71=100).  Domestic  prices  of  product  groups  that
have  high  import  penetration  ratios  have  increased  faster  than  the  overa,l
price  index  in  manufacturing.
In  this  context,  deregulation  has  a  very  important  effect  on  domestic
prices.  Easing  of  entry  barriers  in  many  subsectors  lead  to  a  rush  of
investments  and  eventually  creation  of  excess  supplies.  These  excess
supplies  prohibit  many  firms  from  enjoying  the  full  protection  permitted
by  the  tariffs.  Thus  for  many  product  groups,  domestic  prices  are  much
lower  than  landed  import  prices.
7/  In  many  products,  Government  agencies  import  the  products  at  high
tariffs  and  sell  at  a  price  that  is  lower  than  the  landed  price  cross
subsidizing  the  imports  through  charging  other  levies  on  domestic
production.  This  is  prevalent  in  many  petrochemical  products.- 26  -
TABLE  3: 1987/88  PRICE  INDICES  OF  SELECTED  PRODUCTS
(1970/71u100)
X  of  Average
Import  Ratio  Price  Index
Products  (X  Price  Index  for  Manufacturing
Total  Manufacturing  9  385  100.0
(Excluding  Food  Products  (375)
Paper  16.5  406  105.5
Pulp  417  108.3
Newsprint  541  140.5
Organic  Chemicals  (Benzene)  57  750  194.8
Soaps  (Essential  Oils)  20  800  207.8
Iron  and  Steel  31  567  147.3
Rails  886  230.1
Non-Ferrous  Metals  28  467  121.3
Machinery  24
Machine  Tools  18  511  132.7
Textile  Machinery  20  508  131.9
mining  Machinery  547  142.1
Boilers  (BHEL)  727  188.8
Source:  Revised  Index  Numbers  of  Wholesale  Prices  in  India,  April  1988.
54.  Since  the  share  of  imports  of  these  products  is  very  small  and
concentrated  on  a  few  products,  their  effect  on  the  overall  price  level  has
also  been  small.8/  In  areas  where  domestic  supply  exceeds  iomestic  demand,
firms  cannot  increase  their  prices  to  the  landed  price  of  imports.  The
deregulation  of  domestic  industry,  by  increasing  domestic  supply,  erodes  the
high  profit  margins  and  significantly  reduces  the  effective  protection  enjoyed
8/  Most  new  products  in  electronics,  electrical  machinery  and  organic
chemicals  are  not  In  the  price  index.  If  the  base  year  is  changed  to
include  new  products,  average  price  increases  would  be  higher.- 27  -
by  domestic  producers.  However,  as  long  as  there  are  large  imports  (domestic
supply  being  significantly  less  than  domestic  demand),  in  the  absence  of  price
controls,  domestic  prices  tend  to  move  together  with  landed  import  prices.
(d) Manufacturing  Output
55.  The  growth  performance  of  the  manufacturing  sector  has  shown  large
fluctuations,  corresponding  to  changes  in  the  trade  regime  and  macroeconomic
policies.  While  the  basic  import  substitution  thrust  of  the  policy  regime  has
not  changed  since  the  1960s,  the  tightness  of  import  licensing  and  exchange
rate  policies  have  shown  major  variations.  Similarly  macroeconomic  policies
have  fluctuated  between  being  highly  restrictive  and  expansionary.  This
section  analyzes  the  manufacturing  sector  performance  in  different  subperiods
categorized  by  Government  policies  for  the  trade  regime  and  macroeconomic
policies.
56.  Trade  Regimes.  The  1960-1988  period  can  be  separated  into  three
subperiods  of  varying  stringency  of  import  regulations.  These  subperiods  are
1960/61  to  1965/66,  1966/67  to  1976/77  and  1977/78  to  1987/88.  These
subperiods  differ  in  terms  of  Government  policy,  behavior  of  imports  and
growth  of  output.  Imported  inputs  and  capital  goods  increased  marginally
between  1960/61-1965/66  when  they  accounted  for  almost  50%  of  manufactured
GDP;  were  drastically  restricted  between  1966/67  and  1976/77,  declining  in
absolute  terms  despite  an  output  growth  of  53%,  and  relaxed  following  the
1977/78  Import  Policy.
57.  Table  4 presents  the  growth  rates  of  key  variables  for  the  three
subperiods.- 28 -
TABLE  4:  TREND  RTH  MRAME
(percent  p.a.  in  19808i  prices)
1960/61-65/66  1966/67-76177  1977178-87L88 1960061-87/88
GDP  Total Manufacturing  6.76  4.25  6.24  4.83
GDP  Registered  Manufacturing  8.40  4.44  7.38  5.32
Public  La  19.30  5.22  7.08  6.54
Private  /a  6.52  4.25  7.09  4.91
Total  Imports  5.87  1.39  4.36  2.92
Manufactured  Imports  2.81  0.01  Lb  6.50  2.57
Capital  Goods  7.21  -2.93  9.00  0.87
Intermediates  -1.26  Tb  1.4 /b  4.92  3.09
Gems  and  Jewelry  1.2  /b  8.09  7.51  12.88
a Up  to  1986/87.
5 Not  Statistically  different  than  0.
1970-88.
Source:  National  Accounts, CSO,  Report  on  Currency  and  Finance,  RBI  and  World  Bank  Estimates.
58.  Between 1960/61 and 1965/66, manufacturing  investment,  especially  in
public  sector  firms,  grew  very  rapidly  (8.15%  p.a.)  and  the  shares  of imported
inputs  and  capital  goods  were  high  relative  to  investment  and  output.
Although  manufacturing  import  growth  was  lower  than  that  of  manufacturing
output,  the  share  of  imports  was  quite  high  (almost  50%  in  1962).  Despite  the
balance  of  payments  crisis  and  droughts,  the  manufacturing  sector  graw  quite
rapidly.  Investments  increased  along  with  output  and  the  public  sector  took
the  lead  in  this  growth.
59.  Between  1965/66  and  1976/77,  the  import  regime  got  progressively  more
restrictive  and  complex.  Despite  increases  in  tariff  collection  rate  on
manufactured  imports  (from  30%  in  1969  to  more  than  50%  in  1973)  the  premia  on
imports,  through  REP  licenses,  increased  to  more  than  100%. This  decade  of
basically  restrictive  import  policies  led  to  serious  stagnation,  not  Just  in
terms  of  low  output  growth  but  also  very  low  and  even  negative  productivity
growth  (Ahluwalia  (1985)).  Restrictions  on  imports  of  capital  goods  and
technology  slowly  delinked  Indian  industry  from  the  rest  of  the  world  both  in
terms  of  production  efficiency  and  quality.  Output  growth  in  registered
manufacturing  declined  from  about  8.5%  p.a.  during  the  1961/62-1965/66  period
to  4.5%  p.a.  between  1966/67  and  1976/77.  Private  sector  growth  decelerated- 29  M
from  6.5%  to  4.2%  p.a. Even  bigger  declines  took  place  in  private  investment
growth.  Most  of  the  growth  and  investment  took  place  in  the  public  sector.
Imports  showed  a similar  stagnation,  not  growing  for  almost  a  decade,  while
capital  goods  imports  actually  fell  in  real  terms.
60.  The  third  period  started  in  1977/78,  when  restrictions  on  imports
started  to  be  relaxed.  This  gradual  relaxation  has  continued  until  the
present.  The  relaxation  on  imports  was  also  accompanied  by  the  easing  of
industrial  regulatory  policies,  especially  capacity  licensing  and  controls  on
imports  of  capital  goods.  These  reforms,  accompanied  by  a  significant
increase  in  real  government  spending,  led  to  the  acceleration  of  growth  of
value  added  in  manufacturing  from  4.3%  p.a.  during  the  1966/67-76/77  period  to
6.2% p.a.  during  1977/78-1987/88.  The  registered  manufacturing  sector  has
done  even  better,  with  its  annual  growth  rate  increasing  from  4.4% to  7.4%.
While  increasing  domestic  demand,  fueled  by  growing  real  government  spending,
has  been  one  of  the  causes  of  this  faster  manufacturing  growth,  gradual
deregulation  and  delicensing  and  greater  availability  of  imports  have  encour-
aged  domestic  competition  allowing  firms  to  adjust  their  output  to  match
growing  demand.
61.  Role  of  Public  Sector.  One  of  the  important  determinants  of  manufac-
turing  growth  has  been  the  rapid  expansion  of  public  sector  enterprises.  For
the  1961-87  period,  public  manufacturing  sector  grew  at  around  6.5%  p.a.
compared  to  about  5%  p.a.  for  the  private  registered  manufacturing.  Since
1978,  both  public  and  private  sectors  have  grown  at  about  the  same  rate  of
7%  p.a. Nevertheless,  the  share  of  public  sector  in  registered  manufacturing
GDP  increased  from  12%  in  1961  to  30%  in  1987.
62.  The  role  and  importance  of  the  public  sector  go  beyond  its  share  in
manufacturing  GDP. Central  government  public  enterprises  (CPEs)  have  monop-
olized  production  of  key  raw  materials  and  important  intermediate  goods
(energy,  non-ferrous  metals,  oil  refinery  products  for  petrochemicals).  In
heavy  industries  such  as  steel  and  fertilizers,  CPEs  account  for  about  half  of
domestic  production,  and  about  one-third  in  pesticides  and  pharmaceuticals.
Sectors  in  which  CPEs  predominate  are  aromatics  and  olefins  (share  of  54%  to
100%),  heavy  electrical  equipment  (100%  for  hydro  and  steam  turbo-generators),- 30  -
telecom  equipment  (100%  for  coaxial  and  telephone  cables,  central  switch-
boards),  public  transport  equipment  (100%  in  railway  coaches  and  ship-
building),  and  watches  (66%  of  production).  The  rapid  expansion  of  CPEs  In
the  1970s  (including  the  take-over  of  bankrupt  private  enterprises)  slowed
down  in  the  late  1980s.  Nevertheless,  the  Government  continues  to  create  two
to  three  new  CPEs  each  year  (e.g.,  steel  plants,  chemical  industries).
63.  Behavior  of  Fixed  Investment.  Gross  fixed  investment  (GFI)  in  manu-
facturing  has been an important  determinant  of  the  rate  and pattern  of  growth
of  the  manufacturing  sector.  Periods  of  import  tightening  have also  been
accompanied  by  restrictions  on investment  and imports  of  capital  goods and
technology.  Table  5  gives  the  growth  rates  of  fixed  investment  over  the  three
subperiods.
TABLE  5:  INVESTMENT  GROITH  RATES  IN NANUFACTURING
(percent p.a.)
1960/61-65/66  1966/67-76m77 1977/78-87/88  1960/61-87/88
Total  Gross  Fixed  Investment  (GFI)  10.5  5.4  9.0  5.8
in  Machinery
GFI  in  Registered  Manufacturing  8.2  2.7  7.2  4.2
Publ  icLa  11.7  5.7  9.4  6.3
Private/a  6.2  -0.5/b  4.8  2.5
Capital  Goods  Imports  7.2  -2.9  9.0  0.9
Not  statistically  significant.
Source:  National  Accounts.  CSO,  World  Bank  Estimates.
64.  Gross  fixed  investment  in  registered  manufacturing  has  increased  at
4.2%  p.a.  since  1961. These  growth  rates  again  show  different  behavior  in
different  subperiods.  The  growth  rates  increased  until  1965/66,  declined
sharply  during  the  1965/66-1976/77  period  of  tight  import  policies  and
increased  again  after  1977/78  together  with  reforms  in  import  and  regulatory
policies.  Public  sector  investments  grew  much  faster  than  private  sector
investments  throughout  this  period.  The  share  of  public  sector  investment  to
total  registered  manufacturing  investment  increased  from  36%  in  1960/61  to  41%
in  1965/66  and  finally  to  63%  in  1985/86.  Imports  of  capital  goods,  overall,
have  increased  much  more  slowly  (0.87%  p.a.)  than  overall  fixed  investment  in- 31  -
machinery  (5.78Z  p.a.)  or  fixed  investment  in  manufacturing  (4.2%  p.a.);
showing  the  import  substitution  that  has  taken  place  in  the  machinery
subsector.
65.  While  growth  of  output  has  shown  the  same  cycles  as  that  of  fixed
investment,  efficiency  of  fixed  investment  has  been  higher  under  more  liberal
policy  regimes.  Figure  7  shows  the  capital-output  ratios,  for  public  and
private  registered  manufacturing.
FIG.  7  CAPITAL-OUTPUT  RATIOS  IN  REGISTERED MANUFACTURING
.o  't'III*  tt  SI  '  "
-g
3.0~~~~~~~~~~~~
e2  64  66  6  8  70  72  74  76  78  80  62  64  8e  W
- PRIVA?!  ECTOR  ...  PUBC  SZmR
66.  Two  important  conclusions  emerge  from  Figure  7. First,  capital-output
ratios  in  the  public  sector  (shown  on  the  right  axis)  are  almost  three  times
higher  than  those  in  the  private  sector  (shown  in  the  left  axis).  Second,
changes  in  the  capital-output  ratio  for  the  private  sector  coincide  with
restrictions  on  imports  and  the  share  of  manufactured  imports  to  output.  For
the  private  sector,  capital-output  ratio  increases  steadily  with  some  annual
fluctuations,  from  1.5  in  1961  to  2.8  in  1976,  almost  dolubling  in  fifteen
.years.  With  the  partial  relaxation  of  import  controls  in  1977/78,  the- 32  -
capital-output  ratio  begins  to  decline  and  is  about  2.0  in  1987/88.9/  Thus
despite  much  faster  rates  of  gross  investment  in  periods  where  import  policy
was  more  accommodating,  the  efficiency  of  capital  was  higher.10/  Capital-
output  ratio  for  all  of  manufacturing  has  declined  less  (3.7  in  1976  to  3.1  in
1988)  due  to  the  predominance  of  public  sector  in  fixed  investment  (around
50%)  compared  to  its  share  in  GDP  (around  25%). Continued  public  sector
investments  in  sectors  where  capital-output  ratios  are  high  as  well  as  chronic
inefficiency  of  project  implementation  have  maintained  public  sector  capital-
output  ratios  at  extremely  high  levels.
67.  Recent  estimates  on  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  growth  also  indicate
that  TFP  growth  has  increased  significantly  in  the  1980s  (Ahluwalia  (1991)).
TFP  growth  in  registered  manufacturing  which  averaged  -0.3%  p.a.  between
1965/66  and  1979/80,  increased  to  3.9%  p.a.  between  1980/81  and  1985/86.
While  part  of  this  difference  is  caused  by  faster  growth  in  the  1980s  and
better  capacity  utHiization,  the  elasticity  of  TFP  growth  with  respect  to
value  added  growth  has  doubled  from  0.4  in  the  1970s  to  0.8  in  the  1980s.
Furthermore,  there  is  somewhat  weaker  evidence  that  TFP  growth  is  negatively
correlated  with  the  degree  of  import  substitution.
68.  Macroeconomic  Policy.  Another  important  development  in  the  1980s  has
been  a  more  rapid  growth  of  public  expenditure,  especially  government
consumption.  The  share  of  public  absorption  in  GDP  (investment  plus
consumption)  has  risen  from  less  than  20%  in  the  1970s  to  more  than  32%  in
1990. The  main  cause  of  the  increase  in  public  expenditures  has  been  the  rise
in  government  consumption  from  9%  to  12%  of  GDP  in  the  1980s.  Increasing
government  consumption  share  has  come  largely  from  fast-growing  net  purchases
of  commodities  and  services  (average  real  growth  of  17.5%  over  the  first  v
years  of  the  Seventh  Plan).  Compensation  of  employees  increased  at  about  half
this  rate  (8.4%  p.a.).  The  increase  in  Government  expenditures,  to  a large
extent,  was  met  through  public  sector  deficits.  The ratio  of  public  sector
9/  The  increase  in  1980  and  1981  are  due  to  two  draught  years  which  reduced
manufacturing  output.
10/  Of  course,  it  is  hard  to  separate  the  effects  of  faster  growth  and
capacity  utilization  from  increases  in  efficiency.- 33  -
financing  gap  to  GDP  increased  from  3.6%  in  1970/71  to  about  7%  in  1981  and
about  8.9%  in  1989. As  a  result,  the  consolidated  central  and  state
government debt  grew to  66%  of  GDP  at  the  end of  1989/90.
69.  Rapid growth  of  domestic  demand  driven  by public  expenditure,  substan-
tial  increases  in  tariffs  and  a  more  accommodating  import  policy  after  1977
have  all  led  to  rapid  growth  of  manufacturing  output  1n  the  1980s.  Figure  8
illustrates  the  relationship  between  manufacturing  output  and  real  government
spending.  It  shows  the  growth  rates  of  real  government  expenditure  (lagged
one  year)  and  the  growth  rate  of  manufacturing  output.  The  two  series  are
strongly  correlated.  The  deviation  between  the  two  series  reflect  the
fluctuations  in  agricultural  output,  which  also  has  a significant  effect  on
manufacturing  output.
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70.  Econometric  analysis  of  manufacturing  output  supports  the  hypothesis
that  output  growth  Is  largely  determined by public  expenditure,  fluctuations
in  agricultural  output,  a  more  accommodating  import  policy  as  well  as  a  more- 34  -
relaxed  industrial  regulatory  regime.  Agricultural  output  has  both  supply  and
demand  effects.  On  the  demand  side,  agricultural  incomes  constitute  a  major
force  driving  domestic  demand  given  the  largely  rural-income  based
characteristic  of  Indian  population.  On  the  supply  side,  agricultural  output
provides  intermediate  inputs  into  manufacturing  production.  Total  government
spending  is  another  najor  factor  affecting  output  demand,  partly  through  the
multiplier  effect  but  also  because  the  public  sector  is  responsible  for  a
sizeable  proportion  of  output  as  well  as  investment.  Tariff-adjusted  import
prices  as  well  as  the  tightness  of  the  inport  regime  (resulting  from
quantitative  restrictions),  both  of  which  affect  the  availability  of  imported
inputs,  are  important  determinants  for  output  supply.  An  import  intensity
ratio  (intermediate  imports  as  share  of  manufacturing  GDP)  used  as  a  proxy  for
the  tightness  of  the  import  regime  is  statistically  significant.  Finally,  the
relaxation  of  the  numerous  regulations  imposed  on  the  industrial  sector  since
1984/85  also  has  a  positive  effect  on  outpuit  supply.
71.  The  function  for  manufacturing  output  is  estimated  in  first  difference
of  logs  (growth  rate)  form,  as  follows:
DGDPMF  =  0.01  +  0.49  DTGOVT(-1)  + 0.36  DGDPAG(-1)  + 0.41  DGDPAG
(5.01)  (4.94)  (5.81)
+ 0.061  DMINTOT(-1)  + 0.023  DUM8588
(1.92)  (2.32)
Adj.  R2  =  0.79:  D.W.  = -1.93
where  GDPMF  =  manufacturing  output;  TGOVT  = total  government  spending;
GDPAG  = agricultural  GDP;  MINTOT  = import  intensity  of  intermediate  goods
(imports  of  intermediates  as  a  ratio  of  GDPMF)  and  DUM8588  = dummy  for  the
period  1984/85  to  1987/88.
72.  The  function  explains  around  80%  of  the  fluctuations  in  manufacturing
output.  Agricultural  output  has  a  very  significant  and  large  effect  on
manufacturing  output;  the  short  run  elasticity  is  0.4  while  the  long  run
elasticity  is  0.8. Total  government  spending  also  has  a  very  significant
impact  on  manufacturing  output,  with  a  lag  of  one  period,  and  a  coefficient  of- 35  -
around  0.5.  Import  intensity  of  intermediates  Is  significant  indicating  that
as the import regime is  more  liberal  and  domestic  producers  have  greater
access  to  intermediate  goods  imports,  there  will  be  a  positive  impact  on
manufacturing  output  growth.  Finally,  the  relaxation  of  industrial
regulations  in  1984/85  to  1987/88  as  represented  by  a  dummy  variable  for  that
period  has  a  significant  contribution  to  manufacturing  output  growth.
73.  These  relationships  are  quite  robust  with  respect  to  different
specifications.  If  the  sample  period  is  started  earlier  (from  1966  rather
than  1971),  then  the  coefficient  of  import  intensity  becomes  more  significant
and  the  shift  in  the  equation,  captured  by  the  dummy  variable,  starts  in
1982/83.  The  effect  of  relaxation  of  capital  goods  imports  and  the  effect  of
shifts  in  investment  have  been  more  difficult  to  measure.
C. STRUCTURE  OF  TRADE
74.  Share  of  Trade.  Figures  9  and  10  show  the  share  of  real  imports  and
exports  to  GDP  and  manufacturing  imports  and  exports  to  manufacturing  GDP
respectively.  The  share  of  imports  in  GDP  increased  up  to  1980/81,  partially
due  to  the  relaxation  of  QRs,  and  has  continuously  decreased  since.  The
reasons  for  the  decline  have  been  declines  in  food  and  fuel  imports,
increasing  tariffs  up  to  1986  and  exchange  rate  adjustments  thereafter.
Exports,  on  the  other  hand,  decreased  as  a  proportion  of  GDP  between  1981  and
1986  and  increased  after  that.  Similar  trends  are  reflected  in  the  share  of
manufactured  goods imports  and  exports  in  manufacturing  GDP.- 36  -
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75.  For  more  disaggregated  import  and  export  shares,  it  is  not  possible  to
derive  time  series  data  on  a  consistent  basis.  Howe4er,  it  is  possible  to
obtain  disaggregated  shares  of  imports  and  exports  in  gross  output  for  three
years:  (1973/74,  1978/79  and  1987/88).  The  data  comes  from  the  input-output
tables  for  1973/74  and  1978/79  while  1987/88  data  is  from  World  Bank
estimates.  These  estimates  are  given  in  Table  6  below  and  are  in  current
prices.
rABLE  6:  STRUCTURE  OF TRADE
Ratio  of  imports  Ratio  of  ft,aorts
to Gross Output  to  Gross  u~.ytUt
1973174  1978/79  1987188  1973/74  1978179  1987188
AGRICULTURE  0.59  0.62  0.92  0.83  1.15  1.31
ENERGY  43.72  107.57  44.10  1.21  0.25  0.11
MINERALS  9.66  29.71  23.98  25.47  26.41  43.10
MANUFACTURING  8.37  10.16  8.94  7.12  8.61;  6.76
eood, Beverages, Tobacco  1.48  6.67  2.51  7.49  9.29  6.23
Textiles Leather  0.19  0.54  0.61  13.56  11.76  13.05
Petroleum and Coal  31.95  13.85  6.48  6.87  1.41  4.59
Products
Chemicals  16.76  17.83  12.14  3.18  3.09  2.72
Non-Metallic Mineral Products  4.09  19.86  28.38  1.11  24.51  34.25
Metal Products  1.03  4.14  4.41  5.66  8.12  3.15
Metals  16.69  15.50  13.97  2.90  6.92  0.99
Machinery  35.93  20.12  24.79  5.90  6.24  2.82
Electrical Appliances and  0.44  9.14  16.21  0.00  11.13  4-16
Electronics
Transport Equipment  1.45  2.53  4.42  4.57  4.18  2.25
Others  7.42  14.54  10.15  9.10  9.21  3.81
TOTAL  4.22  6.87  7.17  3.55  5.10  4.99
(Total  Manufacturing
Excluding Gems and  7.87  9.09  8.04  7.12  7.85  5.60
Petroleum Products)
Source:  Data for 1973/74 and 1978/79 are from the five-year plans.  1987/88
has been estimated by World Bank from the updated inpu_-output table.
76.  The  trends  in  agriculture  indicate  marginal  changes  in  the  trade
component  of  output.  Energy consists  of  imports  of  crude  oil  and the  changes
have to  do with  the  discovery  of  gas and oil  in  India  after  the  1979 oil  price38  -
shock.  The  share  of  imports  to  gross  output  in  manufacturing  has  increased
between  1973/74  and  1978/79  but  has  declined  since  then. The  increase  in
1978/79  can  be  explained  by  the  relaxation  of  import  controls  after  1977.
However,  the  import  regime  continued  to  be  further  relaxed  in  the  1980s.  The
number  of  items  in  OGL  has  increased  substantially.  Import  preinia  on  REP
licenses  have  declined  to  an  average  of  less  than  10%  over  most  of  the
1980s.11/  Despite  these  changes,  the  share  of  imports  in  manufacturing  output
declined  from  about  10%  to  9%  between  1979  and  1988.12/  The  decline  in
exports  is  even  more  pronounced,  from  8.7%  to  6.2%.
77.  The  disaggregated  manufacturing  sub-sectors  indicate  that  the  decll,.e
after  1979  is  quite  broad  based.  Only  three  subsectors  show  increases  in  the
import  ratios.  These  are  non-metallic  minerals,  electrical  appliances  and
electronics  and  transport  equipment.  In  non-metallic  minerals,  the  growth  of
exports  and  imports  are  due  to  trading  in  gems,  which  is  basically  imports  for
exports.  Import  ratios  have  declined  in  other  non-metallic  minerals  such  as
cement.  In  the  transport  equipment  subsector,  the  share  of  imports  increased
marginally  from  2.5%  to  4.6%. However,  total  imports  in  1988  were  only  about
US$350  million  of  which  half  were  imports  of  ships  and  rail  equipment.  The
shares  of  imports  in  shipbuilding  and  rail  equipment  increased  from  12.9%  and
1.6%  to  55.1%  and  5.8%  respectively.  In  motor  vehicles,  import  shares
declined  from  2.9%  in  1979  to  2.8%  in  1988. In  two-wheelers,  the  increase  in
import  shares  was  from  0.1%  to  5.3%  while  in  other  transport  equipment  import
shares  actually  declined  from  408%  to  0.7%  of  output.  In  electrical
appliances  and  electronics  total  imports  were  again  around  US$550  million,  the
bulk  of  which  is  components  for  computers  and  picture  tubes  for  TVs. In
electronics  including  televisions,  the  import  share  actually  came  down  from
31%  to  23.5%.  In  electrical  appliances  the  import  share  increased  from  3.6%
/  Import  premia  on  individual  products  have  gone  up  as  high  as  40%  for
short-periods  of  time  due  to  delays  in  imports  by  canalizing  agencies
and/or  temporary  shortages  in  domestic  supply.
2/  Import  and  export  prices  increased  faster  than  domestic  prices  during
the  1980s,  especially  after  1986. If  the  comparison  is  made  in  real
terms  (i.e.,  in  1978/79  prices),  the  decline  from  1978/79  to  1987/88  is
even  larger.  For  total  manufacturing,  the  share  of  imports  in  real
terms  declined  to  8.04%  in  1987/88  from  10.16%  in  1978/79.  Thus  the
decline  is  about  2%  of  gross  output,  a  significant  decline.- 39  -
to  13.8X,  the  only  sector  which  had  a  significant  increase.  Again,  total
imports  in  this  subsector  was  only  about  US$140  million.  In  machinery,  there
is  a  marginal  increase  (again  more  in  value  terms  than  in  real  terms),  but  the
ratio  of  imported  to  domestic  machinery  has  not  reached  its  1973/74  level.
78.  The  situation  is  similar  in  exports.  Other  than  gems  and  surplus
petroleum  products,  the  share  of  exports  has  declined  across  the  board,
indicating  the  lack  of  competitiveness  of  the  manufacturing  sector  and  the
attractiveness  of  producing  for  the  closed  domestic  market.
79.  These  developments  also  indicate  that  between  1978/79  and  1987/88,  the
beginning  of  specialization  (i.e.,  intra-sectoral  imports  and  exports)  was
reversed.  This  is  especially  true  in  metals,  machinery,  electrical
appliances,  motor  vehicles  and  a  host  of  other  subsectors.  In  most  of  these
industries,  both  import  and  export  shares  have  declined,  indicating  that  the
import  substitution  bias  of  the  trade  regime  has  increased.  The  economy  has
moved  away  from  a  production  pattern  somewhat  based  on  comparative  advantage
towards  autarky.
D. CONCLUSIONS
80.  These  disaggregated  results  confirm  the  aggregate  conclusions  of  the
previous  analysis  that  the  changes  in  tariffs  and  other  instruments  have  more
than  compensated  for  the  relaxation  in  the  import  regime.  Foreign  trade  has
contracted  relative  to  domestic  output  despite  some  relaxation  on  QRs  and
attempts  to  increase  exports.  The  main  reason  for  this  decline  has  been  the
increase  in  relative  prices  of  imports  to  domestic  output  due  to  increasing
tariffs,  large  real  devaluations  especially  after  1986,  and  rapidly  expanding
domestic  demand  that  has  increased  the  attractiveness  of  the  domestic  market
relative  to  exporting.
81.  Although  the  reforms  in  the  policy  environment  have  led  to  faster  growth
of  manufacturing  output  and  productivity,  the  main  force  behind  this  faster
growth  has  been  increases  in  public  expenditure  fueled  by  growing  fiscal
deficits.  A  second  important  variable  has  been  more  accommodating  import
policy  sustained  by  large  external  borrowings.  These  results  indicate  that- 40  -
the  maintenance  of  this  pattern  of  growth  is  not  sustainable  due  to
significant  internal  and  external  stocks  of  debt  that  have  accumulated  over
the  last  decade.  Therefore,  significant  changes  in  the  macroeconomic  and
trade  policy  environment  will  be  needed  to  shift  the  economy  to  a  more  export
oriented  path  to  overcome  both  the  foreign  exchange  shortages  and  to  rely  more
on  external  demand  for  industrial  output.
82.  This  study  also  illustrates  the  high  degree  of  responsiveness  to
relative  price  changes  exhibited  by  the  manufacturing  sector.  Despite  the
elasticity  pessimism  that  pervaded  Indian  policy-making,  the  elasticities
presented  above  are  quite  high,  indicating  that  the  economy  would  respond
favorably  to  changes  in  the  incentives.REFERENCES
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